Exchange market pressure: some caveats in empirical applications by Bertoli, Simone et al.
www.ssoar.info
Exchange market pressure: some caveats in
empirical applications
Bertoli, Simone; Gallo, Giampiero M.; Ricchiuti, Giorgio
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bertoli, S., Gallo, G. M., & Ricchiuti, G. (2008). Exchange market pressure: some caveats in empirical applications.
Applied Economics, 42(19), 2435-2448. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840701858059
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242428
For Peer Review
EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURE: SOME CAVEATS IN EMPIRICAL 
APPLICATIONS 
Journal: Applied Economics 
Manuscript ID: APE-07-0308.R1 
Journal Selection: Applied Economics 
Date Submitted by the 
Author:
05-Nov-2007 
Complete List of Authors: Bertoli, Simone; Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di 
Scienze Economiche 
Gallo, Giampiero; Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di 
Statistica "Giuseppe Parenti" 
Ricchiuti, Giorgio; Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di 
Scienze Economiche 
JEL Code:
F30 - General &lt; F3 - International Finance &lt; F - International 
Economics 
Keywords:
Currency Crises, Exchange Market Pressure, Emerging Countries, 
Sensitivity Analysis, Speculative Attacks 
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
For Peer Review
EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURE: SOME CAVEATS IN 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
Simone Bertoli
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche
Università degli Studi di Firenze 
via delle Pandette 9, 50127 Firenze, Italy
Giampiero M. Gallo
Dipartimento di Statistica “Giuseppe Parenti”
Università degli Studi di Firenze 
viale G.B. Morgagni 59, 50134 Firenze, Italy
Giorgio Ricchiuti
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche
Università degli Studi di Firenze 
via delle Pandette 9, 50127 Firenze, Italy
Abstract
The Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index, developed by Eichengreen et al. (1994), is widely 
used as a tool to signal whether pressure on a currency is softened or warded off through 
monetary authorities’ interventions or, rather, a currency crisis has originated. In this paper we 
show how the index is sensitive to some assumptions behind the aggregation of the information 
available (exchange rates, interest rates and reserves), especially when emerging countries are 
involved. Specifically, we address the way exchange rate variations are computed and the 
impact of different definitions of the reserves, and we question the constancy of the weights 
adopted. These issues compound with the choice of a fixed threshold when crisis episodes are 
identified through the EMP index. As a result, one should exert caution in subsequent 
econometric analyses where a dependent binary variable is built to identify crisis periods. 
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1. Introduction
Currency crises in emerging and developing economies have been extensively analyzed 
in the literature with a variety of analytical tools proposed to identify crisis episodes. 
One of the indeces that are most widely adopted to signal the break up of a crisis is the 
Exchange Market Pressure, EMP hereafter, index introduced in a seminal paper by 
Girton and Roper (1977) to investigate independence of and interventionist stance by a 
Central Bank as a simple average of exchange rate changes and a foreign reserve 
depletion indicator. An extension was suggested by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 
(1994, henceforth ERW), adding the interest rate spread to the index, to describe 
possible monetary policy responses to a disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market 
(or, at least, a sudden surge in short term interest rates as a consequence of a tightening 
liquidity). Their index is an average weighted to equalize the different variability in the 
three variables. 
To the best of our knowledge, ERW were the first to employ the EMP index as a basis 
for the analysis of exchange market behaviour for developed countries; when the EMP 
index passes over a threshold, excess pressure is flagged and a binary variable 
representing a crisis takes on a value of one for that period. 
The EMP index is meant to capture depreciations but also the type of pressure on a 
currency (as would happen in the presence of depreciation expectations) which is 
softened or diverted through monetary authority interventions, and does not necessarily 
show up in the observed behaviour of nominal exchange rate dynamics (i.e. `Peso 
Problem’ type, Evans, 1996) . In this view, crisis episodes occur even if speculative 
attacks are not successful. 
Other papers have used the index (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1996; Tudela, 2004), at times 
defined differently and with a different threshold to define a crisis. Some (e.g Sachs et 
al., 1996) limit themselves to a two-component version, which excludes interest rates. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) do the same but on the 
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2
ground of data limitations, while Tanner (2001) has more theoretical objections to the 
insertion of what she sees as a response variable rather than an indicator. 
This paper focuses on the methodological issues related to the use of the EMP index, as 
this has found a wide adoption in the literature on currency crises (Eichengreen et al., 
1994, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; Sachs et al., 1996; Tanner, 2001; Tudela, 
2004). Without questioning the general theoretical framework within which the index is 
derived, we point out how seemingly harmless - and often hidden - choices required in 
the aggregation of the components of the index, may affect the results of subsequent 
empirical analysis. The EMP index may thus suffer from some weaknesses that cast 
doubts on its reliability as a basis for econometric analysis, especially when emerging 
countries are involved.
Several issues related to the adoption of the EMP index will be described in this paper. 
In the second section we discuss the way in which such an index is built, pointing out 
the statistical issues that emerge when multi-dimensional information is used. In the 
third section, we highlight the ad hoc assumptions introduced to build a binary crisis 
variable from the EMP index and the limits of a parametric definition of a crisis1. In a 
preliminary attempt to show how methodological choices do matter and are able to 
affect the econometric analysis on currency crises determinants, we employ data from a 
sample of 26 countries to show how the EMP index and the subsequent crisis indicator 
vary with different choices available.2 It is important to consider emerging countries 
alike, since the sensitivity of the EMP index proves to be directly related to the specific 
economic characteristics of a country, and for these countries data limitations are likely 
to be more binding. Finally, we discuss the issues surrounding the choice of a suitable 
country benchmark is not neutral, especially when emerging countries are involved. We 
1 We will not discuss the recent contributions by Haile and Pozo (2006) and Pontines and Siregar (2007), 
who avoid a parametric definition of the index using the Extreme Value Theory.
2
 See the Appendix for a description of the dataset. 
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3
thus extend the discussion by Pontines and Siregar (2007) who have pointed out how 
replacing Japan to the US as the reference country, the EMP index for some East Asian 
currencies changes significantly, along with its capacity to signal the actual crisis 
episodes that hit this area in the late 1990s. Concluding remarks follow.
2. The Exchange Market Pressure index
The EMP index proposed by ERW is defined as:
f f
t % t t t t tEMP = e +(i -i )+(r -r ) [1] 
that is a weighted average (with positive weights ,  and ) of three variables: % t e  is 
the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate against a reference currency,
f
t t(i -i )  represents the variation in the spread between the domestic interest rate and the 
foreign interest rate3, and finally ft t(r -r )  is the change in the spread between foreign 
reserves, relative to monetary base, abroad and at home.4 ERW employed quarterly 
data, while of most of the later applications use monthly data (Klaassen and Jager, 2006, 
being a notable exception), although such a data frequency could fail to capture 
episodes of short but intense speculative pressures on a currency. The EMP index can 
take values on the real line, with high positive values associated to a pressure on the 
domestic currency, as a combination of a nominal depreciation, a widening of the 
interest rate spread or a loss of foreign reserves. The insertion of the interest rate 
variable is not void of possible criticisms in that domestic interest rates may not be an 
3
 The recent paper by Klaassen and Jager (2006) develops a model-free version of the EMP index, where 
the interest rates enter in levels rather than in first differences. 
4
 The monetary base, defined either as M0 or M1, can be endogenous to the stock of foreign reserves in 
small open economies, so that the ratio of foreign reserves over the monetary base may fail to reveal the 
extent of direct interventions on the exchange market, as the two series move together (the Argentinean 
currency board of the 1990s represents an extreme example of such a dynamic), and – if data limitations 
are not binding - alternative standardization of the foreign reserves should be explored. 
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4
intermediate policy target in all countries. In certain episodes, though, the change of 
interest rate spreads may signal a temporary liquidity tightening or some measure to 
avoid capital flights.
To avoid an overlapping of the issues that arise from the construction of the EMP index 
itself with those that emerge from its use as a crisis indicator, we will focus on the 
former in this section and devote the next section to the latter. Particularly, we will first 
discuss how three different issues influence the index: the choice of the weights; the use 
of logarithmic difference to approximate the percentage change of the exchange rate; 
the inclusion of gross or net foreign reserves. The EMP index turns out to be notably 
sensitive to seemingly minor choices, and this poses the problem of its fine tuning, as it 
is not always possible to rank possible alternatives, and different choices can be 
defended on different empirical or theoretical grounds.
2.1 Weighting
Since the three variables underlying the EMP index are usually characterized by 
different variability, their aggregation has to be conducted in such a way that prevents 
the most volatile component from dominating the whole index. The standard deviation 
of exchange rate variations and of the interest rate differential has a sample average, 
excluding Argentina, of approximately 1.5 and 900 times that of the foreign reserves 
movements. ERW suggest standardizing the three components, i.e. using the reciprocal 
of the country-specific standard deviation of the relative series as weights in [1], in 
order to equalize unconditional variances. This notwithstanding, financial time series 
are characterized by volatility clustering (Engle, 2004) and/or structural breaks, so that 
constant weights do not allow to adequately smooth changing variability.5
5 Moreover, the presence of isolated peak values in a series drives down the weight that is attached to it, 
virtually reducing the dimensionality of the index; to provide a telling example, Argentina recorded a 
7-digit interest rate change in 1990 in a desperate attempt to stop the fall of the peso.
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To illustrate the point, Figure 1 reports the monthly change in the nominal exchange 
rate of the Italian lira against the German mark and the changes in the Italian interest 
rate over the period 1970-1998. It shows the change in the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate of the Italian lira against the German mark when Italy entered the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and when it quit it in 
September 1992; by the same token, domestic interest rates exhibit sudden changes in 
volatility as well, occurring at times in correspondence to a successful deflection of 
exchange rate pressure. Thus, a standardization of the index components through their 
respective sample variances implies that the evolution of the series fails to convey much 
information to the index during periods of low volatility. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The volatility clustering of the different series could be consistent with changes over 
time of the preferred instruments that are chosen by the monetary authorities in order to 
deal with pressure on the domestic currency.6 A separate phenomenon requiring some 
sort of time varying weights involves countries which have experienced hyperinflation 
episodes, which translate into wild swings in some nominal aggregates.7
Possible attempts to overcome the tight limits of fixed weights rely either on moving 
standard deviations or to compute sample variances over sub-intervals of the time frame 
of the analysis, i.e. five or ten years standard deviations. Further suggestions include, as 
6
 Li et al. (2006) argue that“all three components are considered policy variables whose volatilities reflect 
at least in part the authority’s preferences for policy strategies [...] Ideally, one should strip out the reserve 
volatility caused by the free market and retain the policy part of the volatility.”
7
 Pontines and Siregar (2007) replace the nominal with the real exchange rate during the hyperinflation 
episodes, but this approach does not address the impact of hyperinflation on the domestic nominal interest 
rate, and it introduces a further discretionary choice in the construction of the EMP index, namely the 
identification of hyperinflation periods.
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6
in Haile and Pozo (2006), the possibility of estimating GARCH-type conditional 
standard deviations, when time series properties are consistent with volatility clustering.
2.2 Exchange rate variations 
The first component of the EMP index that appears in [1] is given by the rate of change 
of the nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency against an anchor currency over 
the period of reference. With a few exceptions, the method used to compute the rate of 
variation is left unspecified.8 The logarithmic difference provides a good approximation 
of the rate of change around zero, and hence its use is rather immaterial as far as this 
choice refers to developed countries. But the structural differences that characterize the 
distribution of the monthly rate of variations of the nominal value of developed and 
emerging countries’ currencies imply that the method of computation does matter when 
emerging countries are involved. An enduring tendency towards depreciation, coupled 
with periods of sudden and sharp loss of value, is mostly found when looking at the 
evolution of the nominal exchange rate between an emerging country’s and a developed 
country’s currency in the long run. This trend may be due to several underlying factors, 
most notably the existence of a positive inflation differential with the reference country. 
On the other hand, the nominal exchange rate between a pair of developed countries 
tends often to be fairly stable if a sufficiently long time span is considered, and monthly 
variations tend to be smaller in absolute value. 
To illustrate this point, Figure 2 shows the distribution of the monthly rate of variation 
of nominal exchange rate with the US dollar for the Uruguayan peso and the British 
pound. The distribution of the monthly rate of change of the exchange rate between the 
pound and the US dollar has a mean of 0.13 percent, and it is fairly symmetric around 
zero. On the other hand, the distribution of the rate of change of the Uruguayan peso 
8
 Eichengreen et al. (1996) employ logarithmic differences, while Pontines and Siregar (2007) use the 
exact formula.
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7
against the US dollar has a mean equal to 5.28 percent; it is asymmetric, with 94.92 
percent of the observations signalling depreciation, and with a thicker upper tail. For the 
pound, just one observation lies above 10 percent (September 1992), i.e. outside the 
range that is shown in the plot, while for the peso we find ten observations above that 
threshold.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The relevance of the method used to compute the variation of the exchange rate is 
twofold: first, logs provide a poor approximation of the rate of change when this is 
large; second, and most notably, the logarithmic approximation determines a 
significantly lower variance of the sample distribution of the rate of variation of the 
nominal exchange rate for most emerging countries. A priori, it is not possible to predict 
whether the use of logarithms will generate a distribution with a higher or smaller 
variance, as the log function is a contraction mapping on the domain (1, +) and an 
expansion mapping in the domain (0, 1).9 But, if the sample values of the rate of change 
lie disproportionately above or below zero, the use of the logarithmic approximation 
influences the standard deviation of the transformed values in a predictable way. For the 
Uruguayan peso, the standard deviation of its monthly rate of change is 0.47 when the 
rate is computed with the exact formula and 0.17 when logs are applied. For the British 
pound we need a four-digit precision to appreciate a difference between the two 
methods, as the standard deviation decreases from 0.0242 to 0.0241. To strengthen this 
point, Table 1 shows the two sets of values of standard deviations for the sample 
countries. The difference is negligible for developed countries, while it shows up as 
systematic for emerging countries. The most notable differences are reported for Latin 
American countries, many of which experienced hyperinflation in the 1980s and in the 
9
 See Bertoli et al. (2006) for a formal demonstration of the impact of a contraction mapping over the 
variance of a series.
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8
1990s, and this caused sharp and prolonged depreciations of their currencies. For Chile, 
Peru and Uruguay, the use of logarithms reduces the standard deviation of the exchange 
rate variable to less than half of the value that is found when rates of variation are 
computed with the exact formula. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
2.3 International reserves
The inclusion of international reserves in the EMP index is intended to capture those 
episodes of speculative pressure driving the central bank to intervene on the foreign 
exchange spot market in defence of its currency. However, just a part of a central bank’s 
operations translate into a variation in the level of international reserves; a central bank 
can attempt to defend its currency by drawing on stand-by credits or through 
off-balance-sheet transactions, as forward market interventions, thus not committing 
any of its foreign assets on the spot market. Thailand’s gross international reserves had 
remained fairly stable in the first six months of 1997, but the severe currency crisis of 
July 2 occurred when it became apparent that all of its foreign assets had already been 
committed on the forward market (Stiglitz, 2002). Similarly, Goldstein (2001) argues 
that “Korea’s lending of reserves to commercial banks meant that the figures on gross 
reserves conveyed a misleading impression of the authorities’ usable liquid assets”, so 
that these episodes clearly show the limitations of inferring the magnitude of monetary 
authorities’ interventions on foreign exchange markets from variations in the level of 
reserves, but this remains the only feasible option as central banks do not give notice of 
their off-balance-sheet operations.10
10
 Other papers (Goldstein and Hawkins, 1998; Lee, 2001) mention the significant transfer of foreign 
currency from the Central Bank to the South Korean banking system, but do not quantify the dimension 
of these off-balance-sheet operations, and Goldstein and Hawkins (1998) also resort to an extremely 
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9
Data availability is a strong constraint, at times, in what concerns a central bank’s 
foreign assets since they may be reported either net or gross of international liabilities. 
Choosing one or the other, or even mixing the two measures in a cross country context 
is by no means neutral as differences can be rather substantial and the movements of 
gross and net reserves sometimes can convey conflicting information, thus leading to 
different perceptions of the pressure a currency is subject to. The inclusion of gross 
reserves may be preferable if one is interested in liquidity crises, while net reserves may 
be better suited for studies on the determinants of solvency crises.
If the choice between gross and net reserves is not guided by a clear cut definition of 
financial crisis, this should be influenced by the need to treat in a consistent way the 
countries that are included in the sample. Countries may differ with respect to the 
frequency with which they activate credit lines in foreign currencies, and the same 
country can change over time its reliance on off-balance-sheet operations to face 
speculative pressure on its currency. When gross reserves are chosen as a component of 
the EMP index, the index will reveal, ceteris paribus, a softer pressure on a currency 
whose exchange rate is backed by the activation of credit lines in foreign currencies.11 If 
the monetary authorities can draw resources from these credit lines, they can face 
speculative pressure on their currency without having to deplete their gross foreign 
assets. In particular, countries can activate a stand-by arrangement or a loan with the 
International Monetary Fund when they experience Balance of Payments need. The 
amount of Fund credit and loans outstanding is reported for each member country by 
the IFS, and this series – that is published on a monthly basis by the IMF - can be used 
cautionary description of these interventions, as they observe “it has been suggested that some of the 
Korean international reserves were not usable as they had been lent to banks” (emphasis added). 
11
 The choice between net and gross reserves implies a change in the weights, if the weights of the three 
components of the index are chosen so to equalize their conditional variability. However, from our 
sample it does not emerge any systematic difference in the volatility of gross or net reserves, and changes 
in the weights are rather small. 
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to account for a specific form of international liabilities that is extremely significant for 
emerging countries.12
To provide a concrete example, Figure 3 shows the evolution of international reserves –
both gross and net of the liabilities towards the IMF – for Argentina over the period 
1993-2002 and for Italy in the 1970s. The figure for Argentina reveals a prolonged 
period of Fund assistance: focussing on the crisis of 2001 shows that the pattern 
followed by net reserves signals a much greater incidence of the crisis than what be 
inferred looking at the evolution of gross reserves. The inclusion of either series in the 
EMP index will thus provide a different picture of the recent Argentinean crisis.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
When international reserves are considered net of monetary authorities’ liabilities 
towards the IMF, this allows for the inclusion in the same sample of countries that 
receive significant financial assistance from the IMF before or in the aftermath of a 
crisis, and countries that do not. The different paths followed by Malaysia and South 
Korea in 1997, after the crisis had broken out in Thailand, constitute a good example of 
the need for a consistent treatment of international reserves variations for countries that 
have to be included in the same sample. As it is well known, Malaysia pursued its own 
12 This series does not include the undrawn balance of a stand-by agreement with the IMF; Mussa and 
Savastano (2001) point out that “more than a third of all Fund arrangements approved between 1973 and 
1997 ended with a disbursement of less than an half of the initially agreed support. [...] Mainly these were 
cases where the program went off track because policies deviated significantly from those agreed with the 
IMF and subsequent negotiations failed to reach agreement on a modified program.”. This reflects the 
strong conditionality of the IMF credit, that suggests that the undrawn balance of a stand-by agreement 
should not be considered as resources that can be freely disposed of by a central bank to defend its 
currency.
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adjustment program, introducing temporary restrictions to capital movements, without 
drawing resources from the IMF. On the other hand, South Korea received 11 billions 
of US dollars in December 1997, and its debt towards the IMF kept on rising till 
October 1998, when it reached 18.7 billions, well above 1,600 percent of its Fund quota. 
The resources South Korea received from the Fund in December 1997 amounted to 
more than an half of its gross international reserves. 
If reserves are considered gross of central bank’s liabilities towards the IMF, then there 
is the risk of underestimating the pressure a currency is subject to, when its reserves are 
supported by large inflows of Fund credit. Even though this point is clearly relevant for 
emerging countries, it should be noted that if the time span of the analysis covers the 
1970s, the need to account for liabilities towards the Fund concerns developed countries 
as well, as in Figure 3. In the 1970s and early 1980s, several European countries 
received credit from the IMF, often well above their respective Fund quotas. For 
example, in January 1976, Italian liabilities towards the IMF were almost three times
the level of Italian gross foreign reserves, and thus its net reserves were negative.
3. EMP-based definitions of currency crises
A widely adopted approach to the analysis of currency crises entails the division of 
sample observations among crisis episodes and periods of tranquillity. This requires an 
identification rule: the crises could be defined either as the transition between two 
different exchange rate regimes, as the flotation of a pegged exchange rate, or as 
exceptional movements of the nominal exchange rate (Frankel and Rose, 1996) or of a 
broader index of excess demand for foreign currency, as the EMP index13.
In ERW and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) a crisis is signalled when the EMP index is 
above a critical threshold defined as a function of the (country-specific) sample mean 
13 See Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) for an overview of identification rules proposed in the literature.
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and standard deviation of the index. Hence, their index (IC) reveals a currency crisis in 
period t when the standardized EMP index crosses a threshold : 







	=
>=



µ-EMPif0

µ-EMPif1
EMP
EMPt
EMP
EMPt
t
t
IC
IC
[2]
The definition of the critical threshold is a discretional “rule of thumb” for the 
identification of a currency crisis, and the crisis set, i.e. the set of observations that are 
identified as crisis episodes, is clearly sensitive to the choice of the width of the 
tranquillity band. ERW set  equal to 1.5, while Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) adopt a critical value of 3. These thresholds seem to be inspired by 
some sort of parametric assumption on the distribution of the standardized EMP index. 
As noted by Haile and Pozo (2006) and by Pontines and Siregar (2007) this may be a 
strong limitation of the procedure as non-normality is to be expected. The crisis set is 
thus dependent on the adopted identification rule, and this suggests the opportunity to 
gather some indications from the previous discussion on the construction of the EMP 
index and undertake some sensitivity analysis on the definition of a crisis. 
Adopting the definition of the EMP index and the crisis identification rule from ERW,14
we can compare the effects of alternative specifications for the items discussed above 
(exchange rate computation, gross or net foreign reserves, weighting). A simple index 
of the distance between outcomes will help us in appraising divergence of the results. 
3.1 Sensitivity analysis for the fine tuning issues 
14
 The rate of variation of the exchange rate is computed with the log approximation, international 
reserves are taken gross of any liabilities, Germany is the reference country for all European countries 
except the United Kingdom while the US is the reference country for the remaining countries. The 
weights of the three components are time invariant, the average and standard deviation of the EMP index 
are computed over the whole sample and finally  is set equal to 1.5 
Page 13 of 33
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
Actual episodes of currency crisis - as the ERM crisis of 1992, the Tequila crisis of 
1994, the Asian Flu of 1997 or the most recent Argentinean crisis – may seem to 
represent a natural benchmark against which the empirical relevance of fine tuning 
issues concerning the EMP index could be assessed. Still, these episodes are actually 
not well suited to gauge the relevance of these issues, and the reason is that these crises 
determined actual currency crashes, i.e. large upward variations in the nominal 
exchange rate, so that hardly any variation in the underlying choices can influence the 
capacity of the EMP index to detect these episodes. EMP indices have been introduced 
in the literature to identify those episodes of intense speculative pressure that do not 
determine currency crashes, as “crises, devaluations and flotations are overlapping but 
distinct sets of turbulent foreign exchange market events.” (Eichengreen et al., 1995). 
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) argue that “it is important to capture both the episodes 
that end up with a sharp change in the exchange rate, as well as those successfully 
withstood by the authorities”, and modifications in the construction of the EMP index 
can be expected to have a larger impact on the latter than on the former type of 
episodes. We admit that this benchmark is more elusive than the one represented by 
notorious currency crashes, but we maintain that this is more coherent with the rationale 
behind the introduction of EMP indices, that is a dissatisfaction with crisis definitions 
based solely on exchange rate movements.
Let us consider the classification of each period in the sample as a crisis or a tranquil 
period according to the specification adopted, and let us define a country-specific 
divergence index Divi,j, between two different specifications i and j: 
Divi,j = i j
i j
#(IC IC )
1-
#(IC IC )


[3]
that is, 1 minus the ratio of the number of periods classified as a crisis by both 
specifications to the total number of crises identified by either specification. This 
measure ranges between 0 (perfect coincidence of the two crisis sets) and 1 (no 
common identification). Table 2 displays the extent of divergence when a) the rate of 
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exchange rate variation is computed exactly (0.01 average divergence for developed 
countries versus 0.10 for emerging countries), b) the reserves are taken net of liabilities 
towards the IMF (0.01 versus 0.16), and c) the three components are standardized 
through 11-year moving standard deviations (0.24 versus 0.34).
Looking at developed countries, it is apparent that the way exchange rates and reserves 
are computed is irrelevant: the logarithmic difference provides a close approximation of 
the actual rate of variation of the exchange rate of their currencies, and the use of either 
gross or of net reserves in ERW does not significantly affect the identification of a crisis 
period.15 This is not true for emerging countries: hyperinflation episodes in Latin 
America imply that logarithms provide a poor approximation of the sudden and wide 
depreciations of the domestic currencies they induced. Moreover, the relevance of the 
choice between either gross or net reserves extends to Asian countries as well, 
especially to Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, as they draw heavily on IMF credit. 
As noted above, the largest overall changes come from time-varying weights which 
affect developed countries as well with highest values for Sweden (0.44), Italy (0.30) 
and the United Kingdom (0.27). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis relative to the Threshold
The choice of the threshold is an arbitrary “rule of thumb”, aimed at detecting ‘enough’ 
crises: as the threshold increases, the crises detected are fewer and necessarily the worst 
ones. Since the outcome of this analysis is to classify periods, it is necessary to 
investigate what type of results would be ensuing. Table 3 reports the percent of periods 
identified as a crisis for each country as a function of the threshold . Several features of 
15
 A minor exception is United Kingdom, that, as noted earlier, recorded periods in the 1970s where its
net reserves were negative.
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this table are worth pointing out: first and foremost, the inadequacy of the same 
parametric distribution as a reference distribution for the standardized EMP index (the 
first row reports the reference values of the probability to the right of the corresponding 
threshold value under a normal distribution). 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Standardization is not enough to induce normality (especially for emerging countries): 
most empirical distributions are positively skewed (20 out of the 25 countries), and the 
kurtosis is above 3 for all countries. If one chooses a fixed threshold, Table 3 says that 
for lower levels of , a larger number of crises are signalled for developed than for 
emerging countries, while the situation reverses as  increases (pointing to fatter tails for 
the emerging countries). With the value adopted by ERW,  =1.5, for example, the 
percentage of periods identified as crises for developed and emerging countries is 5.88 
and 3.92 respectively, while when  =3.0 we find 1.29 for developed and 1.48 percent 
for emerging countries. Even the ordering of countries within the sample relative to the 
number of crises detected changes with the threshold: Germany passes from the 3rd to 
the 23rd place when  increases from 1.5 to 2.0; United Kingdom has the second highest 
incidence when the threshold is set at 1.5, while it has the second lowest when this 
moves to 3.0. The reverse happens to Mexico and Argentina.
The rate at which the number of crises detected for developed countries decreases with 
greatly outpaces the corresponding rate for emerging countries. This suggests that 
episodes of crisis detected for emerging countries correspond to a higher value of the 
(standardized) EMP index and, in a way, they are less sensitive to a fixed  when this is 
large. This leads to the seemingly counterintuitive finding that emerging countries tend 
to have a smaller number of crises when  =1.5. The empirical evidence provided shows 
that the distributions of the EMP indices are quite different from one another and calls 
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into question the very definition of a crisis: it sounds less appropriate to use the same 
threshold to define a crisis for a country than it is to refer to country-specific 
characteristics.
Adopting a sort of Value at Risk framework, we may define as extreme periods worthy 
of attention those episodes which occur with at most a certain probability. The 
extension of a parametric EMP-based identification rule to a set of diverse countries 
suggests that, as already noted by Pontines and Siregar (2007), we need to move 
towards alternative identifications rule that can better handle the sample distribution of 
the index. As noted, Table 2 provides an illustrative example of how the binary crisis 
variable is sensitive to one of the three fine tuning issues that have been discussed in the 
previous subsections. But, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical study so far has 
tested the robustness of its results to changing definitions of crisis or to different choices 
related to the underlying index. Table 4 displays the 95th percentiles of the sample 
distributions of the standardized EMP index built according to eight different 
specifications as before. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
There are noticeable variations both by column (across countries) and by row (across 
specifications), although the averages by country subgroup are fairly stable, roughly 1.6 
for developed countries and 1.3 emerging countries. Across countries we can mention a 
widespread range, e.g. in the first column between 1.38 for Japan and 1.98 for 
Denmark, and between 1.11 for Thailand and 1.63 for Mexico. Within countries the 
ranges are spread as well: Argentina and South Korea, for example, have 95th 
percentiles in the ranges 1.25-1.64 and 1.16-1.48 respectively. 
To complete the analysis, Table 5 displays the 99th percentiles of the sample 
distributions of the standardized EMP index. If the threshold were to be set at a higher 
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value so that only 1 percent of the periods is classified as a crisis episode, the values 
increase considerably and more so for emerging countries than for developed ones (on 
average roughly 3.82 and 3.35 respectively). The variability across countries and 
specifications is maintained as well.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
4. The Reference Country
In the construction of the EMP index, a country is selected as a suitable benchmark in 
order to avoid reading the switches in the relevant domestic data driven by changes in 
the conditions prevailing on international markets as signals of pressure on the 
exchange market. The obvious benchmark for European countries has been Germany 
while the US is the reference country for the other OECD countries (see ERW). 
However when emerging countries are involved, the choice is not as clear-cut. While 
Pontines and Siregar (2007) were the first to raise the point that the anchor currency 
may have a bearing on the sensitivity of the crisis index, their findings reveal just a 
specific case of a systematic impact of any shift in the reference country, as shown in 
the following Proposition (proof of which is available in Bertoli et al., 2006):
Proposition– Given three countries, A, B and C, let ABtEMP denote the 
EMP index for country A at time t with the reference country B. If the 
variations of the nominal exchange rate are computed as logarithmic 
differences and the same weight is attached to each component of the 
EMP indices in [4], then we have an add-up relationship:
AC
tEMP = 
AB
tEMP + 
BC
tEMP [4]
Under the hypothesis introduced in the Proposition, the shift in the reference country is 
equivalent to adding the EMP index between the two reference countries to the original 
index. Although the weights differ across countries in most empirical applications, the 
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relationship described in [4] can be shown to provide a good approximation of the 
impact of a shift in the reference country even when the hypothesis of identical sets of 
weights is violated16. 
Table 6 displays the changes in six Asian countries’ crisis sets when Japan replaces the 
US in the role of reference country. The first (respectively, second) letter in the label of 
each column reflects whether the period is identified as a crisis, c, or tranquil, n, when 
Japan (the US) is the reference country. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
The extent of divergence of the two crisis sets is remarkable: on average the change in 
the reference country (from the US to Japan) determines a degree of divergence –
computed as in [4] - equal to 0.56 between the two alternative crisis identification rules. 
In the case of Singapore, the two rules agree just in 5 out of the 34 periods that are 
identified as crisis by either of the two. For Malaysia and Thailand, the degree of 
divergence amounts to 0.65 and 0.53 respectively. The evidence provided thus confirms 
and extends the results advanced by Pontines and Siregar (2007), and suggests that the 
choice of the appropriate anchor currency for East Asian countries is likely to have a 
significant bearing on the analysis of currency crisis determinants.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a detailed description of the issues that arise from the adoption of 
the EMP index to study currency crises. The EMP index represents a step forward from 
previous studies that relied on exchange rate movements alone to identify speculative 
pressures on a currency. Particularly, it is widely used to study currency crises since it 
allows to signal those pressures on a currency that are softened or warded off through 
16 For brevity’s sake we do not include this result (achieved using data from the seven Asian countries) in 
this paper; the estimates are available upon request from the authors.
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monetary authorities’ interventions, thus avoiding a bias in the selection of crisis 
episodes due to the missing observation of unsuccessful speculative attacks, as it would 
happen if the selection rested merely on nominal exchange rate movements. However, it 
presents some problematic characteristics that deserve a thorough scrutiny. 
Three fine tuning issues related to the index construction were reported, regarding: the 
weighting scheme adopted to combine the three underlying variables, the suitability of 
logarithmic differences to compute the percentage change of the exchange rate, and the 
theoretical issues that arise from the inclusion of net rather than gross reserves. 
Whenever possible, we have indicated possible alternatives, or the criteria that should 
inform the choice. Since the EMP index, as we have rather extensively argued and 
showed, is notably sensitive to these seemingly minor choices, these should be 
explicitly stated and described, and the robustness of the results of following 
econometric analysis should be carefully assessed. Furthermore, we have shown that 
differences in the structure of the economic system, such as those observed in emerging 
countries; strongly affect the consistency of the assumptions and, consequently, the 
results that can be achieved. Even the widely accepted use of logarithms can quite 
significantly distort the EMP index for these countries. This simple example is revealing 
of how an analytical tool that has been first created for OECD countries is not well 
suited for a straightforward application to emerging countries. In addition evidence 
provided confirms that, since reference country may have a significant impact the 
analysis, a preliminary study is needed to evaluate the appropriate anchor. 
In synthesis, an alternative EMP-based definition of crisis has to be still country-
specific, but at the same time it has to satisfy two additional properties that do not 
belong to previous definitions. The properties that characterize the proposed definition 
are: 1) spatial relativity; 2) temporal relativity; 3) the classification of past observations 
does not depend on future data.
Page 20 of 33
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
20
While the first property is shared by ERW definition, the other two represent an attempt 
to overcome two weaknesses of their crisis indicator. Indeed, the time invariance of the 
crisis threshold can constitute an undesirable feature if the EMP index presents some 
clusters of high volatility. These drive up the threshold, and render the index insensitive 
to those speculative pressures that occur during period of low volatility. Thus, instead of 
taking sample mean and standard deviation over the whole sample, moving average and 
standard deviation can be employed, computed over a period that is long enough to 
detect structural breaks in volatility from periods of increasing pressure. However, this 
possible approach suffers from two main shortcomings: first, it shrinks the sample size 
and information is lost, as a centred moving average is a function of lags and leads and 
thus missing values are generated for the initial and final observations. Second, it is not 
consistent with the third property, as the classification of an observation is still 
dependent on future values. 
At least two reasons can be advanced to justify the desirability of the independence of 
the identification of past observations from future data, a property that is satisfied by the 
definitions employed by Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kumar et al. (2003). First, an 
instrumental one, as the dependence of past identifications on future observations gives 
rise to a never-ending process of data revision, while a second reason relates to the 
analytical perspective from which currency crises are observed. While subsequent data 
are useful to put the conditions prevailing on the exchange market in an historical 
perspective, these should not be relevant in a more policy-oriented approach, that is 
more interested on the evaluation that economic agents give of current events. 
This paper suggests that existing EMP-based crisis indicators may not be well suited for 
the study of currency crises in emerging countries, as they lead to a questionable 
selection of crisis episodes, and suggests that emerging countries are much less 
crisis-prone that developed countries. In order to test the actual relevance of this 
intuition, we intend to deepen this research in two complementary directions: first, to 
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understand punctually and clarify the differences between ERW index of crises and our 
proposed crisis selection rules; second, to build different crisis sets according to 
diverging crisis selection rule, and to employ these sets as explanatory variables in an 
econometric analysis – either a logit or a probit model - on currency crises determinants.
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Appendix – Outline of the dataset
We have collected monthly data for a sample of 26 countries over the period 
1970-2002. The sample is made up of ten European countries (Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom), seven Latin American (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela), seven Asian (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea and Thailand), the United States of America and Canada. Data limitations 
influenced the choice of the sample countries, and thus our sample is not meant not be 
representative of either developed or emerging economies. For the European countries 
that have adopted the euro, the series are interrupted in December 1998.
The data source is given by the International Financial Statistics, IFS, published 
monthly by the International Monetary Fund. The data include:
 monthly average of the nominal exchange rates, line rf IFS;
 short term deposit interest rate, line 60b IFS;17
 total reserves excluding gold, line 1l.d IFS;
 restricted money base, line 34 IFS;
 IMF credit and loans outstanding, line 2tl IFS.
If not otherwise specified, the EMP index is computed – in accordance with ERW –
under the following default choices: the US is the reference country, the series are 
weighted by the reciprocal of their sample standard deviation, exchange rate variations 
are computed as logarithmic differences, reserves are considered gross of the liabilities 
towards the IMF. A crisis is detected whenever the EMP is above its mean plus 1.5 
times its standard deviation.
17
 If unavailable, we have the three months lending rate; for the US, we have used the Treasury Bill Rate.
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Figure 1. Monthly rates of change in the nominal exchange rate of the Italian Lira against the German 
Mark (upper panel) and in the Italian nominal interest rate (lower panel) 
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Figure 2. Distribution of monthly rate of change of nominal exchange rate against the US Dollar
 for the Uruguayan Peso (upper panel) and the British Pound (lower panel), 1970-2002
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Figure 3. Foreign Reserves, Gross and Net of liabilities towards the IMF (billion of US Dollars),
 Italy 1970-1980 (upper panel) and Argentina 1980-2002 (lower panel)
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Table 1.  Standard deviations of monthly nominal exchange rate returns: 
Ratios of the values obtained via a logarithmic approximation to those obtained with the exact formula.
ratio (percent) ratio (percent)
Developed countries 99.58 Emerging countries 71.56
Denmark 100.00 Argentina 60.60
Finland 99.16 Chile 44.81
France 99.23 Colombia 99.34
Germany 100.37 Mexico 85.74
Italy 99.19 Peru 37.34
Netherlands 100.00 Uruguay 36.59
Spain 98.80 Venezuela 69.99
Sweden 98.35 Indonesia 82.96
United Kingdom 99.59 Malaysia 98.52
Canada 100.00 Philippines 88.69
Japan 100.72 Singapore 100.00
South Korea 89.37
Thailand 96.51
Turkey 81.94
Note: We report averages by group of countries (Developed, respectively, Emerging), as a synthetic 
reference. 
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Table 2. Divergence index Divi,j across specifications of the EMP index
Exchange Rate
(Log vs. Exact 
Formula)
Reserves
(Gross vs. Net)
Weights
(Constant vs. 
Time-varying)
Developed countries 0.01 0.01 0.24
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.25
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.14
France 0.00 0.00 0.21
Germany 0.00 0.00 0.25
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.30
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.23
Spain 0.06 0.00 0.16
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.44
United Kingdom 0.03 0.07 0.27
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.14
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.16
Emerging countries 0.10 0.16 0.34
Argentina 0.20 0.38 0.38
Chile 0.38 0.14 0.59
Colombia 0.07 0.00 0.19
Mexico 0.05 0.28 0.25
Peru 0.33 0.31 0.76
Uruguay 0.31 0.23 0.41
Venezuela 0.00 0.25 0.20
Indonesia 0.13 0.13 0.13
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 0.33
Philippines 0.00 0.05 0.15
Singapore 0.05 0.00 0.29
South Korea 0.06 0.16 0.38
Thailand 0.00 0.18 0.18
Turkey 0.00 0.06 0.22
Note: We report averages by group of countries (Developed, respectively, Emerging), as a synthetic 
reference.
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Table 3 Percent of episodes identified as crisis as a function of the threshold 
Values of the threshold 
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Reference value when the 
distribution of the EMP 
index is assumed normal.
6.68 2.28 0.62 0.13
Percent of episodes identified as crisis
Developed countries 5.88 3.48 2.10 1.29
Denmark 7.78 4.90 2.59 0.86
Finland 5.76 3.46 2.31 1.44
France 5.76 3.46 2.31 1.73
Germany 6.34 2.02 0.86 0.58
Italy 5.19 4.03 2.59 2.31
Netherlands 5.76 4.03 2.31 1.73
Spain 4.90 3.46 2.59 1.73
Sweden 5.19 2.88 2.02 2.02
United Kingdom 7.34 3.54 1.52 0.51
Canada 6.33 3.80 2.53 1.27
Japan 4.30 2.78 1.52 0.25
Emerging countries 3.92 2.64 1.84 1.48
Argentina 5.06 3.80 2.53 2.53
Chile 3.04 1.77 1.52 1.01
Colombia 3.54 2.03 1.27 1.01
Mexico 5.57 3.04 2.78 2.03
Peru 3.04 2.03 1.27 1.27
Uruguay 3.29 2.03 0.76 0.51
Venezuela 3.29 3.04 2.28 2.03
Indonesia 3.54 2.78 2.03 1.27
Malaysia 4.56 3.04 2.28 2.03
Philippines 4.56 2.53 2.28 1.77
Singapore 4.56 3.54 1.77 1.01
South Korea 4.05 3.04 1.52 1.27
Thailand 2.78 1.52 1.27 1.27
Turkey 4.05 2.78 2.28 1.77
Note: We report averages by group of countries (Developed, respectively, Emerging), as a synthetic 
reference.
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Table 4. 95th percentiles of the standardized EMP index with different specifications
Exchange rate Logarithmic approximation Exact formula
Weights Constant Time-varying Constant Time-varying
Reserves Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
Developed countries
Denmark 1.98 1.98 1.91 1.91 1.98 1.98 1.90 1.90
Finland 1.56 1.58 1.64 1.64 1.57 1.57 1.63 1.63
France 1.53 1.53 1.71 1.71 1.54 1.54 1.71 1.71
Germany 1.53 1.53 1.63 1.63 1.55 1.55 1.64 1.64
Italy 1.53 1.52 1.70 1.70 1.51 1.51 1.70 1.70
Netherlands 1.64 1.64 1.53 1.53 1.64 1.64 1.53 1.53
Spain 1.44 1.47 1.52 1.52 1.47 1.47 1.50 1.50
Sweden 1.53 1.53 1.71 1.71 1.52 1.52 1.70 1.70
United Kingdom 1.82 1.82 1.66 1.66 1.84 1.84 1.67 1.67
Canada 1.73 1.73 1.84 1.84 1.73 1.73 1.84 1.84
Japan 1.38 1.38 1.46 1.46 1.39 1.39 1.47 1.47
Emerging countries
Argentina 1.53 1.44 1.64 1.47 1.25 1.43 1.30 1.61
Chile 1.25 1.30 1.38 1.48 1.20 1.22 1.04 1.05
Colombia 1.32 1.32 1.28 1.28 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
Mexico 1.63 1.58 1.66 1.55 1.58 1.48 1.60 1.49
Peru 1.24 1.32 1.13 1.43 0.94 1.10 0.92 1.45
Uruguay 1.26 1.08 1.29 1.30 1.19 1.05 1.27 1.28
Venezuela 1.27 1.28 1.27 1.22 1.22 1.18 1.23 1.14
Indonesia 1.24 1.20 1.25 1.05 1.21 1.07 1.25 1.05
Malaysia 1.41 1.41 1.46 1.46 1.41 1.40 1.46 1.46
Philippines 1.38 1.43 1.46 1.46 1.39 1.44 1.40 1.45
Singapore 1.49 1.49 1.42 1.42 1.49 1.49 1.42 1.42
South Korea 1.32 1.48 1.16 1.35 1.30 1.44 1.18 1.39
Thailand 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.04 1.10 1.11 1.14 1.04
Turkey 1.39 1.40 1.25 1.29 1.28 1.29 1.19 1.27
Notes: the different columns report the 95th percentile of the standardized EMP index according to three 
different choices in the construction of the index: logarithmic approximation versus exact formula; 
constant versus time-varying weights; gross versus net reserves. By row, the lowest and the highest 
values across the eight specifications for each country are reported in Boldface and Boldface Italics, 
respectively.
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Table 5. 99th percentiles of the standardized EMP index with different specifications
Exchange rate Logarithmic approximation Exact formula
Weights Constant Time-varying Constant Time-varying
Reserves Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
Developed countries
Denmark 3.00 3.00 3.10 3.10 3.05 3.05 3.13 3.13
Finland 3.75 3.75 3.83 3.83 3.76 3.76 3.84 3.84
France 3.65 3.65 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.69 3.69
Germany 2.36 2.36 2.71 2.71 2.41 2.41 2.75 2.75
Italy 4.36 4.38 3.72 3.72 4.40 4.42 3.83 3.72
Netherlands 3.91 3.91 3.28 3.28 3.91 3.91 3.28 3.28
Spain 3.30 3.29 3.29 3.31 3.36 3.32 3.32 3.33
Sweden 4.10 4.10 3.51 3.51 4.17 4.17 3.66 3.66
United Kingdom 2.72 2.76 3.14 3.14 2.72 2.75 3.13 3.13
Canada 3.21 3.21 3.40 3.40 3.23 3.23 3.40 3.40
Japan 2.76 2.76 2.75 2.75 2.82 2.82 2.82 2.82
Emerging countries
Argentina 4.79 5.26 4.75 5.13 5.64 5.28 5.59 5.23
Chile 3.54 3.22 3.40 3.50 3.07 3.04 4.39 4.47
Colombia 3.11 3.11 2.96 2.96 3.16 3.16 3.06 3.06
Mexico 4.53 4.82 4.31 4.70 4.78 4.95 4.33 4.93
Peru 4.06 4.93 3.37 4.03 3.39 4.29 2.76 3.85
Uruguay 2.37 2.45 2.47 3.07 2.27 2.40 2.52 2.93
Venezuela 4.67 4.45 4.68 4.49 4.31 4.08 4.45 4.25
Indonesia 3.37 3.51 3.74 3.85 3.32 3.44 3.64 3.74
Malaysia 3.67 3.66 4.09 4.09 3.74 3.73 4.20 4.20
Philippines 4.07 3.79 4.28 4.06 4.06 3.75 4.40 4.19
Singapore 3.11 3.11 2.81 2.81 3.12 3.12 2.82 2.82
South Korea 3.18 3.50 3.13 3.72 3.06 3.39 3.07 3.68
Thailand 4.13 4.04 4.04 3.94 4.24 4.15 4.15 4.05
Turkey 4.59 4.50 3.92 3.55 4.51 4.52 3.88 3.59
Notes: the different columns report the 99th percentile of the standardized EMP index according to three 
different choices in the construction of the index: logarithmic approximation versus exact formula; 
constant versus time-varying weights; gross versus net reserves. By row, the lowest and the highest 
values across the eight specifications for each country are reported in Boldface and Boldface Italics, 
respectively.
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Table 6. Periods classified as crisis for six Asian countries 
according to the reference country chosen
Periods classified as crisis when the reference 
country is
Both the US 
and Japan Just the US Just Japan Divi,j
Indonesia 13 3 0 0.19
Malaysia 12 6 16 0.65
Philippines 16 2 9 0.41
Singapore 5 13 16 0.85
Thailand 8 3 6 0.53
South Korea 12 4 6 0.45
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